PRINCIPLE VII :

Ensure Transparency of Elections and Election Records

Principle VII Checklist for Election Integrity

A. Ensure All Processing, Voting, Tabulation Procedures Are Open to Meaningful Public Observer and Media Access

1. Mandate uniform statewide standards granting meaningful public and media observer access to all stages of election processes. 
2. Require multipartisan observer access (including media representatives) with meaningful proximity to observe all election procedures, including notice of and access to pre-election logic and accuracy testing, absentee ballot processing and verification, voting (including voter verification at the polls), tabulation, and post-election reconciliation, canvassing, reporting and certification procedures, with clear rules to protect observer rights, training requirements, and anti-intimidation protections for both poll officials and observers.
3. Prohibit actions by poll officials that render observation meaningless, e.g., distant viewing, time limits or requirements preventing full observation, or exclusion from any procedures involved in the pre-election, voting, tabulation, and certification processes.  
   
   

B. ALL Election Records (Including Electronic) Are by Law Public Records That Must Be Retained for 24 Months

1. All election-related records—both paper and electronic—are public records that shall be made available at no cost to the public.
2. Election records include:  

• Voter Registration and Voter Rolls. Records related to voter registration, including, but not limited to voter registration applications, accepted registrations, rejected registrations, the computerized list of eligible voters, verification records confirming identity, eligibility, residency and citizenship status of each voter; voter rolls, including the full name, address, date of birth, party affiliation, voting history, cast vote records, and other information collected and retained by the election office for purposes of the creation and maintenance of the statewide list of eligible voters, provided that personal identifying information as defined in this Act may be repressed from public disclosure; list maintenance records, including list maintenance audit procedures, policies, reports, communications and policies related to voter registration, voter rolls, and list maintenance.
• Vote by mail records. Records related to vote by mail, including but not limited to notices to voters of vote by mail policies and procedures, all mail ballot applications, records related to verification of mail ballot applications and rejections, correspondence with voters applying for mail ballots, all election mail regarding mail ballots, absentee ballots, ballot envelopes, mail ballot chain of custody documents, policies and procedures regarding verification of absentee and vote by mail voters.
• Verification of voter eligibility records. Documents and records related to verification of a voter’s eligibility to cast a ballot, including but not limited to voter affidavits provided by voters voting in-person, and/or by provisional, absentee and/or mail.
• Election personnel records. Records related to identity and eligibility of election officials, and workers, including full time, part-time, and temporary election workers, including but not limited to records confirming and/or regarding party affiliation, confirmation of U.S. citizenship, and other legal requirements governing voter eligibility.
• Records related to voting and the voting process. Records related to voting and the voting process including but not limited to poll books, all paper records of voter check-in), qualified or eligible voter list, tabulation reports, lists of participating voters by election and voting location, including the voter’s name, unique voter identification number, voting jurisdiction (precinct or ward) and the method by which their ballot was cast; reports prepared by election workers and officials, oaths and sworn statements of officials overseeing the election, reports of errors in tabulating, counting, or canvassing and resolution of errors, reports regarding provisional ballots requested, issued, and the resolution of each provisional cast; reconciliation reports and records regarding resolution of discrepancies, and all other records related to the voting, tabulation, and counting process.
• Technology records. Records of logic and accuracy testing of all equipment used or to be used in the election, including but not limited to records regarding software updates and installation, communications with system vendors, vendor contracts and securing and storage of election equipment between elections.
• Chain of Custody records. Protocols and procedures for securing and retaining all documents identified:; Chain of custody logs and all records tracking and transferring of equipment to and from voting locations, records related to drop boxes or other receptacles and polling places, and chain of custody records for security of ballots from the chief election official of the jurisdiction to polling locations, security of ballots once voted, by deposit into any voting machine or tabulator, or other receptacle; chain of custody of applications for absentee ballots, sending of absentee ballots to a requestor or a voter if no request is required, and chain of custody for returned absentee ballots; original removable media used to transfer election results and records related thereto.
• Records sent or received via US Mail or other means. Delivery and processing of all records related to election records sent or received by US mail, commercial mail, or hand-delivery, including but not limited to absentee ballots, records of ballot processing and delivery; records of undeliverable or forwarded election mail.
• Cast Vote records. The cast vote record (CVR) and corresponding ballot images for each ballot cast and counted, together with the identifiers used to link a cast vote record (CVR) to a ballot image, but which may under certain circumstances be randomized to ensure the identity of the voter is protected.
• Tabulator records. Tabulator logs from each tabulator used to tabulate votes in a Federal Election.
• Records of Reconciliation and Certification of Results. Election results certificates, official tallies of all votes including a record of the total number of voters casting a ballot in each voting location, the number of ballots cast in each voting jurisdiction (precinct or ward) by each vote method recognized in the state, records of any spoiled or missing ballots, and the number of voters casting ballots in each voting location. Reconciliation of the number of voters to the number of ballots cast by all methods of voting, which numbers shall match and be identical; the report of the resolution of discrepancies as to the inability of the numbers of voters cannot be reconciled to the number of ballots cast at any voting location; records produced and signed under penalty of perjury for certification of the election results as accurate.
• Canvassing board reports. The certification reports and summaries of vote verification processes utilized during the federal election.
• Incident reports. Copies of all incident reports submitted by election officials or voters and the records regarding disposition of all complaints and Incident reports related to the election.
• Post-Election Records. Post-election audit reports, documents, parameters for the conduct and implementation of such audits.
• Other Records of the Election, in All Formats. All other records may be developed, generated, or produced by election officials pertaining to voter registration, voter rolls, list maintenance, the administration and conduct of the election and all post-election proceedings, in whatever format and regardless of whether the records are retained by the election office or a third-party vendor or designee.
• Detailed Voter Eligibility and Registration Supporting Documents. Voter registration applications including attached proofs (proof-of-citizenship documents, identity and residency proofs, name-change documents), affidavits or attestations of eligibility (citizenship affirmations, restoration of rights certificates), cancellation requests/forms and related proofs, inactive and canceled registrations, confirmation notices and responses sent to voters, database access logs, verifications and matches (SAVE, SSA Death Master File), and audit reports specific to voter roll maintenance.
• Voted and Physical Ballot Records. All voted ballots (paper, absentee/mail, provisional, UOCAVA, spoiled/rejected, duplicated), unused and spoiled ballots and stubs, ballot envelopes of all types (secrecy envelopes, return envelopes, affidavit envelopes, UOCAVA affidavit envelopes).
• UOCAVA and Military/Overseas Ballot Records. UOCAVA Federal Post Card Applications, transmission requests and logs (including email, fax, electronic methods), witness or self-attestation forms.
• Enhanced Chain-of-Custody and Security Details. Seal number records and logs for tamper-evident seals on boxes, containers, and equipment, custody logs and movement records including any video recordings used for security, inventory logs for ballots and equipment, ballot-transfer forms.
• Poll Worker and Precinct Operations Records. Poll worker oaths, attestations, sign-in sheets, and instructions, precinct-specific reconciliation reports/forms (ballots issued vs. voted, spoiled, unused).
• Detailed Audit, Logic & Accuracy, and Reconciliation Records. Logic and Accuracy (L&A) test results including test decks/scripts, hash validations, and attestations, software/firmware integrity checks and hash validations, pre-election and post-election audit reports (including manual hand-counts, risk-limiting audits, process audits), equipment logs (access logs, configuration changes).
• Certification and Administrative Records. Statements of poll, canvass, and certification documents, election night reporting data and unofficial results.
• Supporting Election Administration Records. Public records requests and responses related to elections, observer logs (where required), vulnerable voter protections documentation (e.g., facility voting logs).

1. Require retention of all election records for a minimum of 24 months after the election (exceeding the federal 22-month requirement under 52 U.S.C. §§ 20701–20706 for federal elections), with secure storage and preservation protocols to enable public access, audits, and legal challenges.
2. Apply public records status uniformly to both physical and electronic records, including those generated or stored by voting systems, election management software, or third-party vendors, with no exemptions for proprietary formats or vendor-controlled data.
   
   

C. Publish / Make Available at No Cost All Election Records (Redacted PII), Including All Chain of Custody Documents, Cast Vote Records, Ballot Images, Electronic and All Other Records Related to the Election

1. Require prompt publication or free public availability (e.g., online posting or on-request access without fees) of all election records, with personally identifiable information (PII) (as defined below) redacted to protect voter privacy while preserving transparency.  
2. Suppression of voter identity (name and address) shall be permitted if a voter presents a court order protecting such public disclosure.
3. Personally identifiable information is defined as full social security numbers. Full date of birth is not personally identifiable information.
4. Establish timelines for availability (e.g., preliminary records before certification, final records promptly after certification) and formats that facilitate public review (e.g., searchable PDFs, machine-readable files where applicable), ensuring records are accessible without undue barriers.
   
   

D. Citizen Standing to Sue if Records Are Withheld or Destroyed

1. Grant explicit statutory standing to any citizen, voter, candidate, or interested party to bring civil action (including mandamus, injunction, or declaratory relief) against election officials or jurisdictions for failure to provide public access to election records, withholding of records, premature destruction, or non-compliance with retention requirements.
2. Provide that such actions may seek court orders compelling production of records, preservation of records, or other remedies, with no requirement to show personal injury beyond the public interest in election transparency.
3. Allow prevailing plaintiffs to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs to incentivize enforcement of public records obligations.
   
   

E. Provide Civil and Criminal Penalties for Withholding / Destroying Election Records

1. Establish civil penalties for election officials or employees who willfully withhold, delay access to, or fail to produce required election records upon lawful request, including fines per violation or per day of delay.
2. Impose criminal penalties (e.g., misdemeanor or felony depending on intent and harm) for intentional destruction, alteration, concealment, or premature disposal of election records before the required retention period expires.
3. Include penalties for knowing violations of public records laws related to elections, with enhanced penalties if the withholding or destruction materially affects public trust, auditability, or the ability to challenge election results.

Model Laws for Principle VII. Ensure Transparency of Elections and Election Records

Certification should be based on verified numbers, not assumptions. This Principle provides Model Laws to require strict reconciliation and targeted hand‑count checks before results are certified, to clarify that certification is a discretionary duty tied to accuracy, and to mandate truly independent post‑election audits conducted outside the election offices themselves. Together, these measures create multiple layers of verification—before and after certification—to detect errors, resolve discrepancies, and strengthen public trust in the final results.

Index – Model Laws for Principle VI: Reconciliation, Certification, and Independent Audits

1. Election Reconciliation and Pre‑Certification Hand‑Count Act
   Requires polling‑place, county, and statewide reconciliation so ballots never exceed voters, mandates statewide absentee ballot final reports, and replaces risk‑limiting or statistical audits with pre‑certification hand‑count checks in randomly selected precincts and contests.
   
   
2. Discretionary Certification and Election Official Protection Act
   Defines certification as a discretionary duty tied to reconciliation and accuracy, allows reasonable delays to resolve material discrepancies, and protects officials who in good faith refuse to certify results they reasonably believe are inaccurate or incomplete.
   
   
3. Independent Post‑Election Procedures and Results Audit Act
   Requires independent, post‑certification audits by state auditors or legislative bureaus rather than election offices, with full access to records, documented findings, corrective‑action plans, and opportunities for public comment.

Model Law 1: Election Reconciliation and Pre‑Certification Hand‑Count Act

Section 1. Short Title.

This Act may be cited as the "Election Reconciliation and Pre‑Certification Hand‑Count Act."

Section 2. Polling Place Reconciliation.

(A) After voting has ended at each polling location and before reporting results or transporting ballots to the county or municipal election office, poll workers shall reconcile the number of ballots with the number of voters credited with voting at that location.
(B) Poll workers shall compare:

(1) The total number of ballots cast at the polling location; to
(2) The total number of voters recorded as having voted at the polling location.

(C) The number of ballots cast at the polling location shall not exceed the number of voters recorded as having voted at that location. If the number of ballots exceeds the number of voters, poll workers shall review the records, identify any discrepancy, and resolve it at the polling location before ballots or results are transported.

Section 3. County or Municipality Reconciliation.

(A) Each county or municipality shall conduct a full precinct‑by‑precinct reconciliation of all ballots cast before certifying results.
(B) Officials shall compare, for each precinct and for each method of voting (including in‑person early voting, Election Day in‑person voting, provisional voting, and absentee/mail voting):

(1) The total number of ballots cast; to
(2) The total number of unique voters who voted from that precinct by that method.

(C) For each precinct, and for the jurisdiction as a whole, the total number of ballots cast by each method of voting shall not exceed the number of voters who voted by that method. If the total number of ballots exceeds the number of voters, officials shall review the records, identify the discrepancy, and resolve it before certification.
(D) The complete list of each unique voter who participated in the election, including the method by which the voter cast a ballot, shall be prepared and retained with a copy of the election results and shall be a public record consistent with state law.

Section 4. Statewide Reconciliation.

(A) Prior to certification of the results of any election by the State, the [Chief Election Official] shall reconcile, for each county or municipality:

(1) The total number of ballots cast by all methods of voting; with
(2) The total number of unique voters who voted in the election, by method of voting.

(B) The total number of ballots cast in each county or municipality shall not exceed the total number of unique voters who voted in that jurisdiction.
(C) If the total number of ballots cast in any county or municipality exceeds the number of unique voters who voted, State officials shall review that jurisdiction’s precinct‑level reconciliation records, identify the discrepancy, and ensure that it is resolved before state certification.

Section 5. Absentee Ballot Final Report.

(A) For each election, the [Chief Election Official] shall prepare a statewide "Absentee Ballot Final Report" that includes, by county or municipality:

(1) The number of voters to whom an absentee ballot was issued;
(2) The number of voters who returned an absentee ballot;
(3) The number of voters who did not return an absentee ballot; and
(4) The number of absentee ballots returned but rejected and not counted, with the general reason for rejection.

(B) The Absentee Ballot Final Report is an election record that shall be retained and made available to the public in accordance with applicable election‑records and public‑records laws, including electronic access where feasible.

Section 6. Prohibition of Risk‑Limiting and Similar Audits; Required Pre‑Certification 

Hand‑Count Checks.

(A) Risk‑limiting audits and similar statistical or sampling‑based procedures shall not be used or represented as sufficient to confirm the accuracy of election results for purposes of certification under state law.
(B) Instead, each jurisdiction shall conduct a pre‑certification manual confirmation of machine tabulations as follows:

(1) For each election, at least [no less than two percent (2%)] of all precincts in the jurisdiction shall be randomly selected;
(2) One or more specific contests or races shall be randomly selected for each selected precinct; and
(3) All ballots in the selected contest(s) for each selected precinct shall be hand‑counted by bipartisan or multipartisan teams, and the manual count shall be compared to the machine tabulation.

(C) If discrepancies exceeding thresholds established by rule are identified, expanded hand‑counting or additional audits shall be conducted as prescribed by the [Chief Election Official].

Section 7. Rulemaking and Implementation.

(A) The [Chief Election Official] may promulgate rules necessary to implement this Act, including:

(1) Detailed reconciliation procedures;
(2) Formats for the Absentee Ballot Final Report; and
(3) Standards for random selection and expansion of hand‑count checks.

(B) This Act shall be codified in [Title __, Chapter__ of the State Election Code], and any conflicting provision of law is repealed to the extent of the conflict.
(C) This Act shall take effect on [date], and shall apply to elections held on or after that date.

Model Laws 2: Discretionary Certification and Election Official Protection Act

Section 1. Short Title.

This Act may be cited as the "Discretionary Certification and Election Official Protection Act."

Section 2. Certification Defined as a Discretionary Duty.

(A) Certification of election results by canvassing boards, county or municipal governing bodies, or the [Chief Election Official] is a discretionary duty, not a purely ministerial act.
(B) Election officials responsible for certification shall withhold certification if:

(1) Required reconciliation procedures have not been completed; or
(2) Material discrepancies or unresolved irregularities remain that call into question the accuracy of the results.

Section 3. Preconditions for Certification.

(A) Prior to certification, the certifying authority shall affirmatively determine and confirm that:

(1) All legally required reconciliation, verification, and chain‑of‑custody processes have been completed; and
(2) The results to be certified accurately reflect the ballots lawfully cast, subject only to any disclosed unresolved discrepancies.

(B) The certifying authority shall document its findings regarding completion of required procedures and the status of any discrepancies in a written certification report, which shall be an election record.

Section 4. Handling of Unresolved Discrepancies.

(A) If specific material discrepancies exist that cannot be resolved despite reasonable efforts, the certifying authority may proceed with certification only if it:

(1) Identifies in writing the specific unresolved discrepancies;
(2) Explains why they cannot be resolved; and
(3) Assesses and states whether, in its judgment, the discrepancies are likely to affect the outcome of any contest.

(B) The written explanation of unresolved discrepancies shall accompany the certification and shall be made available to the public.

Section 5. Authority to Delay Certification.

(A) The certifying authority may delay certification of any election for a reasonable period necessary to:

(1) Complete required reconciliation, verification, and audit procedures; or
(2) Investigate and resolve material discrepancies or irregularities.

(B) Standards for delay shall include:

(1) A requirement that the basis for delay be documented in writing;
(2) A requirement that the authority specify what steps are being taken to resolve outstanding issues; and
(3) A requirement that updated status reports be made available to the public at reasonable intervals.

(C) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit indefinite delay or to alter statutory deadlines without express legislative authority, but courts may extend deadlines when necessary to ensure accurate results.

Section 6. Protections for Election Officials.

(A) An election official or member of a canvassing board shall not be subject to civil or criminal liability solely for refusing or failing to certify election results that the official reasonably believes are inaccurate or incomplete due to unresolved reconciliation or verification issues, provided that the official:

(1) Acts in good faith;
(2) Documents the reasons for refusal or delay in writing; and
(3) Cooperates with lawful efforts to resolve outstanding issues.

(B) Nothing in this section shall shield an official from liability for willful misconduct, fraud, or intentional violation of law.

Section 7. Rulemaking and Implementation.

(A) The [Chief Election Official] may promulgate rules to implement this Act, including guidance on documentation, standards for determining material discrepancies, and model forms for certification reports.
(B) This Act shall be codified in [Title __, Chapter__ of the State Election Code], and any conflicting provision of law is repealed to the extent of the conflict.
(C) This Act shall take effect on [date], and shall apply to certifications of elections held on or after that date.

Model Laws 3: Independent Post‑Election Procedures and Results Audit Act

Section 1. Short Title.

This Act may be cited as the "Independent Post‑Election Procedures and Results Audit Act."

Section 2. Independent Post‑Election, Post‑Certification Audits.

(A) After certification of each general election, and for other elections as prescribed by law, an independent post‑election audit shall be conducted to evaluate both:

(1) Compliance with election procedures, including chain‑of‑custody, ballot handling, voter verification, and related processes; and

(2) The accuracy of reported results, including vote counts and tabulation accuracy.

(B) Audits shall be conducted by:

(1) The State Auditor;
(2) A Legislative Audit Bureau; or
(3) Another independent auditing entity designated by law, which is organizationally and operationally independent from the election offices and officials who administered the election.

Section 3. Independence and Access.

(A) Election offices or officials that administered the election shall not conduct or control the post‑certification audit of their own work, but shall cooperate fully with the independent auditors.
(B) Independent auditors shall have access to all election records necessary to perform the audit, including:

(1) Original documents;
(2) Chain‑of‑custody records for ballots and equipment;
(3) Reconciliation logs;
(4) System logs and configuration records; and
(5) Any other records required to assess procedural compliance and accuracy.

(C) Election officials and employees shall be required by law to cooperate with the auditors, and penalties may be imposed for willful failure or refusal to cooperate, as provided by statute.

Section 4. Auditor Qualifications and Scope.

(A) Auditors shall be trained in, or assisted by personnel with expertise in:

(1) The state election code;
(2) Applicable federal election laws and regulations; and
(3) The rules and procedures required by law for administration of elections

(B) The audit scope shall include, at a minimum:

(1) Review of compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements;
(2) Evaluation of chain‑of‑custody and record‑keeping practices;
(3) Testing or review of tabulation accuracy and reporting; and
(4) Assessment of any discrepancies or irregularities identified during or after the election.

Section 5. Documentation, Findings, and Corrective Action.

(A) Auditors shall document each step in the audit process and retain working papers as part of the permanent audit file.
(B) The audit report shall:

(1) Describe the procedures performed;
(2) Summarize findings regarding compliance and accuracy;
(3) Identify any deficiencies or violations; and
(4) Recommend corrective actions and timelines for implementation.

(C) Jurisdictions audited shall be required to respond in writing, indicating the steps they will take to implement recommended corrective actions and the timelines for doing so.
(D) Follow‑up reporting on implementation of corrective actions shall be made to the [State Auditor / Legislative Audit Bureau] and, as appropriate, to the legislature or public oversight bodies.

Section 6. Public Input and Transparency.

(A) Before commencement of each post‑election audit, the auditing entity shall provide public notice of the proposed scope and invite public comment and input for a reasonable period.
(B) A preliminary audit report, including detailed audit findings, shall be made public before the report is finalized, with an opportunity for public comment on issues not yet addressed by the auditors.
(C) Auditors shall consider public comments and, where appropriate, address them in the final report or in an accompanying response document.

Section 7. Rulemaking and Implementation.

(A) The [State Auditor / Legislative Audit Bureau], in consultation with the [Chief Election Official], may promulgate rules necessary to implement this Act, including standards for sampling, documentation, and public participation.
(B) This Act shall be codified in [Title __, Chapter__ of the State Code], and any conflicting provision of law is repealed to the extent of the conflict.
(C) This Act shall take effect on [date], and the first audit cycle under this Act shall apply to elections held on or after that date.

Principle 7 Appendix

Key resources

NVRA and HAVA public‑records concepts (see Policy I U.S. Code citations).
https://uscode.house.gov

EAC – general guidance and resources on election administration and records.
https://www.eac.gov

Your state’s public‑records/open‑records statute (to be inserted).

Examples of proactive transparency portals or statewide election‑results sites from peer states, to be added as your team selects preferred models.

Reports and model resources

American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC)

Audit Election Irregularities Act

https://alec.org/model-policy/audit-election-irregularities-act/ 

Procedural Election Audits Act

https://alec.org/model-policy/prohibiting-foreign-funding-from-ballot-initiatives-act-2/ 

Honest Elections Project (HEP)

Procedural Election Audits Act

https://honestelections.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/OLD-HEP_Model-Bill-Election-Audits_v3.pdf