PRINCIPLE V :

Replace All Vulnerable / Insecure Voting Technology: Only Pre-Printed Secure Paper Ballots, Hand Marked

Principle V Checklist for Election Integrity

A. Eliminate Touchscreens, Ballot Marking Devices, QR Codes Read by Machines

  1. Establish specific dates for phasing out and prohibiting the use of touchscreen voting systems, direct recording electronic (DRE) devices, and ballot marking devices (BMDs) as primary voting methods in all elections. BMDs should only be used as necessary for accessibility for disabled and handicapped voters as described below.
  2. Prohibit Quick Response (QR) codes, barcodes, or any machine-readable codes on ballots that are scanned or interpreted by tabulation equipment for vote determination, to eliminate risks associated with digital encoding or alteration.
  3. Mandate hand-marked paper ballots as the exclusive standard voting method for all voters (except limited accommodations in compliance with the Voters Disability Act ADA), printed pre-election on secure paper with precinct-specific numbering and controls.
  4. Require manual mitigation protocols to confirm results of elections utilizing prohibited technologies during the phase-out period. 

B. Allow for Certain Technology Solely for Disabled Voters, Supervised, Pre-Approved

  1. Permit limited use of assistive voting technology exclusively for voters with disabilities who require accommodations under the Americans with Disability Act (ADA/HAVA), such as approved ballot marking devices or audio-assisted systems, but only when supervised by multi-partisan election officials or designated personnel.
  2. Require pre-approval by the chief election official for any assistive technology.
  3. Require that any assistive technology complies with certification under the Election Assistance Commission’s Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) 2.0 and later.
  4. Mandate strict supervision, chain-of-custody protocols, and public observation for any use of assistive technology to prevent misuse or coercion of disabled voters.

C. Prohibit Internal Modems and All Remote Access Capability for Any Voting Technology

  1. Ban all internal modems, wireless capabilities, internet connectivity, or remote access features in all voting systems, tabulators, election management systems, electronic pollbooks, or any election-related hardware/software.
  2. Require pre-election testing to confirm absence of modems, wireless modules, or remote capabilities, with mandatory physical inspection and removal if present.
  3. Prohibit any post-testing modifications that could introduce connectivity, ensuring air-gapped operations throughout the election process.

D. Mandate Public Pre-Election Testing of All Technology Used in Elections, Not Vendor Controlled

  1. Require public comprehensive, mandatory pre-election logic and accuracy (L&A) testing of all voting equipment, tabulators, election management systems, and related technology 
  2. Mandate multipartisan and public observation of all L&A testing, with reasonable notice to the public, open access for observers, documentation of procedures, and reporting of any discrepancies or remediations.
  3. Prohibit vendor-controlled and/or vendor-conducted testing of their technology products; require independent state or local control of all pre-election testing, with public notice and access, documenting each step in the process and retention of all testing procedures as election records.

E. No Foreign-Owned Voting Equipment Companies, No Foreign-Made Voting Equipment, Databases, Parts, or Software

  1. Prohibit foreign ownership, control, or significant influence in companies manufacturing, supplying, or maintaining voting equipment, software, databases, or election systems.
  2. Ban the use of any foreign-made voting equipment, components, parts, software, firmware, or databases in election administration.
  3. Require certification under penalty of perjury that all election technology is domestically owned and sourced, with audits and penalties for violations.

F. Manual Confirmation and Backup for Any Technology Process, Including Tabulation, Electronic Poll Books (E-Poll Books)

  1. Require manual, human-readable confirmation and backup processes for all technology-dependent steps, including tabulation (e.g., hand-count audits or reconciliation), (paper backup lists), and voter verification.
  2. Mandate the use of hard copy voter registration lists used during an election, requiring daily updates of voter activity each day of an election including early voting and Election Day. 
  3. Require the maintenance of all voter activity that has been recorded in manual poll books and ensure that all data is properly recorded, stored, and available for public inspection. 
  4. Prohibit the use of Electronic Poll Books in any election. 
  5. Mandate paper-based backups and redundant manual procedures to ensure auditability and post-election review of all technology processes used in voting and elections.
  6. Prohibit the use of electronic processes without manual confirmation of each process.
  7. Require hand-marked paper ballots in every election and retention of ballots for a period no less than two years following each election. 

G. Publish Results at Each Voting Location Prior to Delivery to County, Then to State, to Allow Comparison of Results and Data by Public

  1. Require precinct-level tabulation results (including hand-marked paper ballots scanned or counted) to be publicly posted or announced at each voting location before ballots or memory cards are transported to the county level.
  2. Mandate sequential public reporting: precinct results first, then county canvass totals, followed by state reporting, enabling public comparison and verification at each stage.
  3. Ensure published precinct results include vote totals by race/contest, turnout data, and any discrepancies noted and reconciled prior to reporting.

H. All Voting Technology Built on Open-Source Hardware and Software; Eliminate Proprietary Code

  1. Require all voting systems, tabulators, election management software, and related technology to use open-source hardware designs and software code, fully auditable and inspectable by the public and independent experts.
  2. Prohibit proprietary, closed-source, or black-box code in any election-critical systems, ensuring no hidden algorithms or vendor-locked components.
  3. Mandate public availability of source code, hardware schematics, and build instructions for certification and ongoing review, aligned with high-impact security standards that prioritize verifiability.
  4. Common ownership of companies controlling voter information (e.g., e-poll books, voter registration software and management systems, etc.) and voting and/or tabulating systems is inherently susceptible to fraud and should be prohibited.


Model Laws for Principle V. Replace All Vulnerable / Insecure Voting Technology: Only Pre-Printed Secure Paper Ballots, Hand Marked

Elections are most trustworthy when every vote is recorded on a durable, human‑readable paper ballot that can be independently reviewed and recounted. This Principle provides Model Laws to phase out vulnerable electronic voting devices, require hand‑marked paper ballots as the standard, harden all remaining election technology against connectivity and remote access, and ensure systems are domestically controlled, open to inspection, and not concentrated in a few hands. Together, these reforms create a more resilient, auditable election infrastructure in which technology supports—not replaces—transparent, paper‑based records of voter intent.


Index – Model Law for Principle V: Secure Paper Ballots and Technology

  1. Paper Ballot and Assistive Technology Act
    Establishes hand‑marked paper ballots on secure paper as the standard record of voter intent, phases out touchscreen and ballot‑marking devices except as limited ADA accommodations, prohibits QR‑code or barcode‑based tabulation, bans electronic pollbooks, and requires manual backups and audits.

  2. Election Technology Security and Testing Act
    Prohibits modems, wireless connectivity, and remote access in all election systems, mandates pre‑election security testing and public logic and accuracy tests, and requires that testing be conducted under the control of election officials rather than vendors.

  3. Domestic, Open, and Non‑Concentrated Voting Technology Act
    Requires domestically owned and sourced election systems wherever feasible, mandates precinct‑level posting and sequential reporting of results, moves toward open‑source code and designs for election‑critical systems, and restricts risky common ownership of voter‑data and tabulation systems.


Model Law 1: Paper Ballot and Assistive Technology Act


Section 1. Short Title.

This Act may be cited as the "Paper Ballot and Assistive Technology Act."


Section 2. Phase‑Out of Electronic Voting Devices and QR‑Code Ballots.

(A) The use of touchscreen voting systems, direct‑recording electronic (DRE) devices, and ballot‑marking devices (BMDs) as primary voting methods in any election held in this State is prohibited after [date].
(B) During the phase‑out period ending on [earlier transition date, if used], such systems may be used only as provided in Section 4 for voters with disabilities requiring accommodations.
(C) Quick Response (QR) codes, barcodes, or any other machine‑readable codes on ballots that are scanned or interpreted by tabulation equipment for purposes of determining voter selections are prohibited.
(D) Nothing in this section prohibits the use of timing marks or other non‑encoded marks necessary solely for ballot positioning and counting, so long as voter selections are recorded and tabulated from human‑readable text or marks.


Section 3. Hand‑Marked Paper Ballots as the Standard.

(A) Hand‑marked paper ballots shall be the exclusive standard voting method for all voters in this State, except as necessary to provide reasonable accommodations to voters with disabilities under Section 4.
(B) All ballots shall be printed prior to each election on secure paper with appropriate security features, and shall include precinct‑specific numbering or controls sufficient to support chain‑of‑custody, reconciliation, and audits.
(C) Ballots shall be marked by the voter’s hand, using pen or other approved marking instrument, and shall be retained as the official record of voter intent.


Section 4. Limited Use of Assistive Technology for Voters with Disabilities.

(A) The [Chief Election Official] may approve the limited use of assistive voting technology exclusively for voters with disabilities who require accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Help America Vote Act.
(B) Approved assistive technology may include ballot‑marking devices, audio‑assisted systems, or other accessible interfaces, provided that:

(1) The system produces a voter‑verifiable, human‑readable paper ballot that clearly shows all voter selections; and
(2) The paper ballot is cast and counted in the same manner as other hand‑marked paper ballots.

(C) Any assistive technology must be:

(1) Pre‑approved in writing by the [Chief Election Official]; and
(2) Certified as compliant with the most recent version of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission’s Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG 2.0 or later).

(D) Use of assistive technology shall occur only under the supervision of multipartisan or nonpartisan election officials or designated personnel, with chain‑of‑custody protocols and public observation procedures designed to prevent misuse, coercion, or alteration of votes.


Section 5. Manual Confirmation and Backup for All Technology‑Dependent Processes.

(A) For every technology‑dependent process used in election administration, including but not limited to tabulation systems and voter‑registration databases, election officials shall establish manual, human‑readable confirmation and backup procedures sufficient to verify results and reconstruct events.
(B) All elections shall use hand‑marked paper ballots as the primary record of voter intent and as the basis for audits, recounts, and post‑election reviews.
(C) Manual reconciliation or hand‑count audit procedures shall be used to confirm the accuracy of any machine tabulation of paper ballots, under rules adopted by the [Chief Election Official].


Section 6. Prohibition of Electronic Pollbooks and Requirement of Hard‑Copy Lists.

(A) The use of electronic pollbooks or any electronic device as the primary voter check‑in or registration‑list system at polling places or early‑voting locations is prohibited after [date].
(B) Election officials shall maintain and use hard‑copy voter registration lists at each voting location, reflecting:

(1) The list of eligible voters assigned to that location; and
(2) Daily updates of voter activity for each day of early voting and Election Day.

(C) All voter activity recorded in manual pollbooks shall be preserved as part of the permanent election record and shall be available for public inspection consistent with state law.


Section 7. Retention of Paper Ballots and Records.

(A) All hand‑marked paper ballots, including those produced by approved assistive technology, shall be retained for not less than two (2) years following each election, or longer if required by state or federal law.
(B) Paper‑based backups, pollbooks, reconciliation worksheets, and related manual records shall be retained for the same period and maintained in a manner that preserves chain‑of‑custody and supports post‑election audits and reviews.

Section 8. Mitigation During Phase‑Out Period.

(A) During any period in which equipment prohibited by Section 2 remains in use under a transition plan approved by the [Chief Election Official], election officials shall implement manual mitigation protocols to confirm the results of affected elections, including:

(1) Increased sample hand‑count audits; and
(2) Additional reconciliation and chain‑of‑custody checks for any contests or locations using such equipment.

(B) The [Chief Election Official] shall adopt rules specifying the minimum mitigation measures required during the phase‑out period.


Section 9. Rulemaking and Implementation.

(A) The [Chief Election Official] may promulgate rules necessary to implement this Act, including timelines for phasing out prohibited devices, standards for secure ballot paper, and procedures for assistive technology approval and use.
(B) This Act shall be codified in [Title __, Chapter__ of the State Election Code], and any conflicting provision of law is repealed to the extent of the conflict.
(C) This Act shall take effect on [date], with full compliance required no later than [X] months after the effective date.


Model Laws 2: Election Technology Security and Testing Act

Section 1. Short Title.

This Act may be cited as the "Election Technology Security and Testing Act."


Section 2. Prohibition of Modems, Wireless Functions, and Remote Access.

(A) All voting systems, tabulators, election management systems, electronic pollbooks, and other election‑related hardware or software used in this State shall operate as stand‑alone, air‑gapped systems without any modem, wireless capability, internet connectivity, or remote access functionality.
(B) The following are prohibited in any election‑critical system:

(1) Internal or external modems;
(2) Wired or wireless network interfaces, including Wi‑Fi, cellular, Bluetooth, or similar technologies; and
(3) Remote‑access software, services, or configurations that allow off‑site access or control.

(C) Any existing equipment possessing such capabilities shall have them physically removed or permanently disabled before use in any election.


Section 3. Pre‑Election Security Testing and Inspection.

(A) Prior to each election, election officials shall conduct security testing and physical inspection of all voting equipment, tabulators, election management systems, and related technology to verify the absence of modems, wireless modules, and remote‑access capabilities.
(B) Testing shall include, at a minimum:

(1) Hardware inspection for network or wireless components;
(2) Software and firmware review for remote‑access services; and
(3) Network scanning or equivalent technical checks to confirm no external connectivity.

(C) If prohibited capabilities are detected, the equipment shall be removed from service until the issue is corrected and re‑tested, and a written report shall be created and retained as an election record.
(D) No post‑testing modification may be made that introduces connectivity or remote‑access capabilities at any time prior to, during, or after the election.


Section 4. Public Logic and Accuracy Testing.

(A) Before each election, the [Chief Election Official] or local election officials shall conduct public, comprehensive logic and accuracy (L&A) testing of all voting equipment, tabulators, election management systems, and ballot‑definition files to be used in the election.
(B) Public notice of the date, time, and location of L&A testing shall be provided at least [X] days in advance by:

(1) Posting on the election office website; and
(2) Publication or posting as required by state open‑meeting or public‑notice laws.

(C) Representatives of political parties, candidates, and the public shall be permitted to observe L&A testing, subject only to reasonable time, place, and manner rules necessary to protect equipment and the secrecy of any test ballots.
(D) L&A testing shall be documented in writing, including:

(1) The equipment and software tested;
(2) The test deck used;
(3) The procedures followed;
(4) Any discrepancies found; and
(5) The corrective actions taken and re‑test results.

(E) All L&A testing documentation shall be retained as an election record for not less than [X] years.


Section 5. Independence from Vendors.

(A) Pre‑election testing required by this Act shall be conducted under the control and supervision of state or local election officials. Vendors and manufacturer personnel may be present to provide technical assistance, but shall not conduct or control the official testing process or certify the results.
(B) All test plans, procedures, and results shall be created, approved, and maintained by the election office, not by vendors, and shall be available for public inspection consistent with state law.


Section 6. Rulemaking and Implementation.

(A) The [Chief Election Official] may promulgate rules necessary to implement this Act, including technical standards for security testing and detailed L&A procedures.
(B) This Act shall be codified in [Title __, Chapter__ of the State Election Code], and any conflicting provision of law is repealed to the extent of the conflict.
(C) This Act shall take effect on [date], and all equipment used in elections on or after that date shall comply with its requirements.


Model Laws 3: Domestic, Open, and Non‑Concentrated Voting Technology Act

Section 1. Short Title.

This Act may be cited as the "Domestic, Open, and Non‑Concentrated Voting Technology Act."


Section 2. Domestic Ownership and Sourcing; Phase‑In.

(A) Beginning on and after [phase‑in date], all voting systems, tabulators, election management systems, voter‑registration systems, electronic pollbook systems, and any other election‑critical hardware, software, firmware, or databases used in this State shall be:

(1) Owned and controlled by entities that are not subject to foreign ownership, control, or significant influence as defined in subsection (B); and
(2) Manufactured and assembled from components, parts, software, firmware, and databases sourced from within the United States, except as permitted in subsection (C).

(B) For purposes of this Act, an entity is considered to be subject to foreign ownership, control, or significant influence if:

(1) A foreign government, foreign national, or foreign entity directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds a substantial interest in the entity; or
(2) The entity derives a substantial portion of its revenue or strategic direction from foreign government contracts or foreign principals, as further defined by rule.

(C) The [Chief Election Official] may, by rule, allow limited use of non‑domestic components where no reasonably equivalent domestic alternative exists, provided that:

(1) The components are not security‑critical; and
(2) The use is documented and disclosed as part of the system’s certification.

(D) No later than [earlier deadline], the [Chief Election Official] shall adopt a transition plan to replace non‑compliant equipment and systems in time to meet the phase‑in date set in subsection (A).


Section 3. Certification, Audits, and Penalties.

(A) Vendors and providers of election‑critical technology shall certify under penalty of perjury that their systems comply with the domestic ownership and sourcing requirements of this Act and shall update such certifications upon any material change in ownership or sourcing.
(B) The [Chief Election Official] may conduct or commission audits to verify compliance, including review of supply chains, ownership structures, and manufacturing processes.
(C) Violations of this section may result in:

(1) Decertification of the system for use in this State;
(2) Civil penalties up to [$X] per violation; and
(3) Referral for prosecution under applicable state or federal law.


Section 4. Precinct‑Level Posting and Sequential Reporting of Results.

(A) At the close of polls and completion of tabulation at each voting location, precinct‑level results, including results from hand‑marked paper ballots scanned or counted there, shall be publicly posted or announced at that location before ballots, memory cards, or other media are transported to any central facility.
(B) Posted precinct results shall include, at a minimum:

(1) Vote totals by contest or race for that precinct;
(2) The number of ballots cast, including by voting method where applicable; and
(3) Any discrepancies identified and resolved during reconciliation.

(C) Election results shall be reported sequentially as follows:

(1) Precinct‑level posting or announcement;
(2) Aggregation into county canvass totals; and
(3) State‑level reporting of certified results.

(D) Precinct‑level results shall be preserved and made available to the public so that members of the public can compare precinct, county, and state totals.


Section 5. Open‑Source Election Systems.

(A) All voting systems, tabulators, election‑management software, voter‑registration software, electronic pollbook software, and other election‑critical software used in this State shall, as of [open‑source effective date], be based on open‑source code and open hardware designs that are fully auditable and available for inspection by the public and independent experts.
(B) Proprietary, closed‑source, or "black‑box" software or hardware shall not be used in any election‑critical system after the open‑source effective date, except as allowed under subsection (F).
(C) For systems required to be open source under this section:

(1) Source code, build scripts, and relevant documentation shall be published or otherwise made available for public review under a license that permits independent examination and security testing; and
(2) Hardware schematics and build instructions shall be made available to the [Chief Election Official] and independent testing laboratories for certification and ongoing review.

(D) The [Chief Election Official] shall adopt open‑source security and development standards aligned with high‑impact security practices, emphasizing verifiability, reproducibility, and public auditability.
(E) Ownership or control of both voter‑information systems (including voter‑registration databases, electronic pollbooks, and voter‑list management software) and voting or tabulation systems by the same company or corporate group is prohibited where such common ownership would create undue concentration of control or conflict of interest, as defined by rule.
(F) The [Chief Election Official] may grant temporary waivers, not exceeding [X] years, for jurisdictions transitioning from proprietary systems to compliant open‑source systems, provided that:

(1) The jurisdiction has adopted a documented transition plan; and
(2) Additional audit and transparency measures are implemented during the transition.


Section 6. Rulemaking and Implementation.

(A) The [Chief Election Official] may promulgate rules necessary to implement this Act, including:

(1) Definitions and thresholds for foreign ownership or influence;
(2) Criteria for domestic sourcing and permitted exceptions;
(3) Technical standards for open‑source systems; and
(4) Procedures for audits, certifications, and enforcement.

(B) This Act shall be codified in [Title __, Chapter__ of the State Election Code], and any conflicting provision of law is repealed to the extent of the conflict.
(C) The phase‑in date for domestic ownership and sourcing under Section 2(A) shall be no later than [election cycle], and the open‑source effective date under Section 5(A) shall be no later than [subsequent election cycle], unless otherwise provided by law


Principle 5 Appendix

Core technical standards

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800‑53 Rev. 5 – Security and Privacy Controls.
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-53/rev-5/final

Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 200 – Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems.

https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/200/final

NIST Election Security Project – overview.
https://www.nist.gov/itl/voting/research-and-projects/election-security

NIST Election Security Guides (infographics and fact sheets).
https://www.nist.gov/itl/voting/election-security-guides

NIST Voting Systems Program / Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) technical work.
https://www.nist.gov/voting-systems

VVSG 2.0 – Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (EAC).
https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/voluntary-voting-system-guidelines

NIST Cybersecurity Framework Election Infrastructure Profile.
https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/vts/200/1/final

Georgia-specific model/proposal

Senate Bill 214 (2026) – would require transition to hand-marked paper ballots; passed Georgia House 132–39 on April 2, 2026.

Full bill text: https://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/70548

2025–2026 federal legislation support

Make Elections Great Again Act (H.R. 7300) – requires voter-verifiable paper ballots. 

Reports and model resources

American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC)

One Citizen, One Vote Act

https://alec.org/model-policy/safeguard-american-votes-and-elections-act-save-act/