PRINCIPLE VI :

Confirm Accuracy of Election Results Pre-Certification; Require Post Election Independent Audits

Principle VI Checklist for Election Integrity

A. Require Polling Place Reconciliation, as well as County/City, AND State Reconciliation to confirm that the number of ballots cast does not exceed the number of voters who voted in each election jurisdiction.  

States should require both polling place and full precinct reconciliation of all vote methods.

1. Polling Place Reconciliation shall be completed after voting has ended at a polling location but prior to reporting results or transporting ballots from the polling location to the county or municipal election office.  

• Poll workers shall compare the number of ballots cast at the polling location to the number of voters credited with having voted at the polling location. The number of ballots cast at the polling location shall not exceed the number of voters recorded as having voted at the polling location. If the number of ballots cast exceeds the number of voters, the poll workers shall review the records to identify and resolve the discrepancy between the two numbers, which shall be completed at the polling location. 
  
  

2. County or Municipality Reconciliation shall be based upon the total number of ballots cast by each method of voting for each precinct in the jurisdiction. 

• Officials shall compare the number of ballots cast for each precinct, by each method of voting (early in-person voting, Election Day in-person, provisional, and absentee) to the number of unique voters who voted from each precinct by each method of voting. The total number of ballots cast in by each method of voting shall not exceed the number of voters who voted by each method of voting in each precinct in the county or municipality. If the total number of ballots cast in the county (or city) exceeds the number of voters who voted, officials shall review the records, identify and resolve the discrepancy between the two numbers. This full precinct by precinct reconciliation shall be completed prior to certification of results by the county or municipality. 
• The complete list of each unique voter who participated in the election and their method of voting shall be prepared and retained with a copy of the election results and shall be a public record. 
  
  

3. State Reconciliation: Prior to certification of the results of the election by the State, the State shall compare the total number of ballots cast by all methods of voting to the total number of voters who voted in the election, for each county or municipality for all methods of voting. The total number of ballots cast shall not exceed the total number of voters who voted in the election. If the total number of ballots cast in the county (or municipality) exceeds the number of unique voters who voted, State officials shall review the records of that jurisdiction’s precinct-level reconciliation, identify and resolve the discrepancy. This full statewide reconciliation shall be completed prior to certification of results by the State.

States shall prepare and publish a statewide report of the voters to whom an absentee ballot was issued, which voters returned an absentee ballot, and which voters did not return the absentee ballot, and which voters returned an absentee ballot that was rejected and not counted (“The Absentee Ballot Final Report”). 

The Absentee Ballot Final Report is an election record that shall be retained and made available publicly in accordance with the applicable election records law.

B. Eliminate Risk-Limiting and Other Pretend ‘Audits’ of Election Results

1. Prohibit the use of risk-limiting audits (RLAs) as inherently unreliable for purposes of confirming election results. 
2. Adopt requirements for post-election (pre-certification) manual confirmation of machine tabulations as follows: 

• Establish a minimum percentage (no less than 2%) of the precincts in the jurisdiction, randomly selected, of one or more randomly selected specific race(s) for which all ballots in that race are hand-counted (not re-tabulated by machine).
  
  

C. Confirm by Statute that Certification Is Discretionary, Not Ministerial, to Ensure Accuracy of Results

1. Define certification of election results as a discretionary, not a ministerial duty, and requiring that canvassing boards or chief election officials shall withhold certification until reconciliation is completed and until material discrepancies or unresolved irregularities are resolved.
2. Require election officials to affirmatively determine and confirm that all required reconciliation, verification, and chain-of-custody processes have been completed and that results are accurate prior to certification.
3. Provide for certification notwithstanding the existence of and failure to resolve material discrepancies upon a finding of the specific material discrepancy(s) that exist that cannot be resolved.
4. Provide statutory authority for certification to be delayed pending resolution of accuracy issues, with clear standards and documentation requirements. 
5. Provide statutory protections against liability of election officials for refusing to certify election results as accurate if reconciliation and resolution of material discrepancies have not occurred.  
   
   

D. Require Independent Post-Election Audits of Election Procedures & Results by State Auditors / 3rd Party (Not the Election Offices Auditing Themselves)

1. Mandate independent post-election audits of both election procedures (e.g., chain-of-custody, ballot handling, voter verification, etc.) and accuracy of results (e.g., vote counts, tabulation accuracy, etc.).
2. Post-election, post-certification audits shall be conducted by the state auditor and/or a legislative audit bureau or independent of the election office(s) or official(s) who administered the election.
3. Key principles of an effective post-election, post-certification audit of election procedures shall include:
   
   

• Independence of Auditors: The audit must be conducted by an entity other than the election officials, office(s) that administered the election.
• Transparency and Cooperation: Auditors must have access to all election records (original documents) including chain of custody records for each step in the election process and mandatory cooperation by election officials and employees with the auditors, including penalties for failure to cooperate. 
• Expertise in election laws and procedures: Auditors must be trained and have expertise in the election code and the rules and procedures required by law for administration of elections
• Documentation: Auditors must document each step in the audit process as part of the final audit report.
• Accountability and Corrective Action: The audit should assess and report on the jurisdiction’s level of compliance with applicable federal and state laws, regulations, and procedural requirements, with recommendations for improvements and corrective action(s) needed and timelines for and reporting of implementation of recommendations.   
  
  
• Public Input: The post-election, post-certification procedures audit shall include the opportunity for public comment and input into the scope of the audit prior to commencement of the audit. The preliminary audit report containing detailed audit findings shall be made public prior to finalizing the audit report, with the opportunity for public comment and concerns not yet addressed by the auditors and which shall be taken into consideration by the auditors and responses and actions taken included in the final audit report.

Model Laws for Principle VI. Confirm Accuracy of Election Results Pre-Certification; Require Post Election Independent Audits 

Certification should be based on verified numbers, not assumptions. This Principle provides Model Laws to require strict reconciliation and targeted hand‑count checks before results are certified, to clarify that certification is a discretionary duty tied to accuracy, and to mandate truly independent post‑election audits conducted outside the election offices themselves. Together, these measures create multiple layers of verification—before and after certification—to detect errors, resolve discrepancies, and strengthen public trust in the final results.

Index – Model Laws for Principle VI: Reconciliation, Certification, and Independent Audits

1. Election Reconciliation and Pre‑Certification Hand‑Count Act
   Requires polling‑place, county, and statewide reconciliation so ballots never exceed voters, mandates statewide absentee ballot final reports, and replaces risk‑limiting or statistical audits with pre‑certification hand‑count checks in randomly selected precincts and contests.
   
   
2. Discretionary Certification and Election Official Protection Act
   Defines certification as a discretionary duty tied to reconciliation and accuracy, allows reasonable delays to resolve material discrepancies, and protects officials who in good faith refuse to certify results they reasonably believe are inaccurate or incomplete.
   
   
3. Independent Post‑Election Procedures and Results Audit Act
   Requires independent, post‑certification audits by state auditors or legislative bureaus rather than election offices, with full access to records, documented findings, corrective‑action plans, and opportunities for public comment.

Model Law 1: Election Reconciliation and Pre‑Certification Hand‑Count Act

Section 1. Short Title.

This Act may be cited as the "Election Reconciliation and Pre‑Certification Hand‑Count Act."

Section 2. Polling Place Reconciliation.

(A) After voting has ended at each polling location and before reporting results or transporting ballots to the county or municipal election office, poll workers shall reconcile the number of ballots with the number of voters credited with voting at that location.
(B) Poll workers shall compare:

(1) The total number of ballots cast at the polling location; to
(2) The total number of voters recorded as having voted at the polling location.

(C) The number of ballots cast at the polling location shall not exceed the number of voters recorded as having voted at that location. If the number of ballots exceeds the number of voters, poll workers shall review the records, identify any discrepancy, and resolve it at the polling location before ballots or results are transported.

Section 3. County or Municipality Reconciliation.

(A) Each county or municipality shall conduct a full precinct‑by‑precinct reconciliation of all ballots cast before certifying results.
(B) Officials shall compare, for each precinct and for each method of voting (including in‑person early voting, Election Day in‑person voting, provisional voting, and absentee/mail voting):

(1) The total number of ballots cast; to
(2) The total number of unique voters who voted from that precinct by that method.

(C) For each precinct, and for the jurisdiction as a whole, the total number of ballots cast by each method of voting shall not exceed the number of voters who voted by that method. If the total number of ballots exceeds the number of voters, officials shall review the records, identify the discrepancy, and resolve it before certification.
(D) The complete list of each unique voter who participated in the election, including the method by which the voter cast a ballot, shall be prepared and retained with a copy of the election results and shall be a public record consistent with state law.

Section 4. Statewide Reconciliation.

(A) Prior to certification of the results of any election by the State, the [Chief Election Official] shall reconcile, for each county or municipality:

(1) The total number of ballots cast by all methods of voting; with
(2) The total number of unique voters who voted in the election, by method of voting.

(B) The total number of ballots cast in each county or municipality shall not exceed the total number of unique voters who voted in that jurisdiction.
(C) If the total number of ballots cast in any county or municipality exceeds the number of unique voters who voted, State officials shall review that jurisdiction’s precinct‑level reconciliation records, identify the discrepancy, and ensure that it is resolved before state certification.

Section 5. Absentee Ballot Final Report.

(A) For each election, the [Chief Election Official] shall prepare a statewide "Absentee Ballot Final Report" that includes, by county or municipality:

(1) The number of voters to whom an absentee ballot was issued;
(2) The number of voters who returned an absentee ballot;
(3) The number of voters who did not return an absentee ballot; and
(4) The number of absentee ballots returned but rejected and not counted, with the general reason for rejection.

(B) The Absentee Ballot Final Report is an election record that shall be retained and made available to the public in accordance with applicable election‑records and public‑records laws, including electronic access where feasible.

Section 6. Prohibition of Risk‑Limiting and Similar Audits; Required Pre‑Certification 

Hand‑Count Checks.

(A) Risk‑limiting audits and similar statistical or sampling‑based procedures shall not be used or represented as sufficient to confirm the accuracy of election results for purposes of certification under state law.
(B) Instead, each jurisdiction shall conduct a pre‑certification manual confirmation of machine tabulations as follows:

(1) For each election, at least [no less than two percent (2%)] of all precincts in the jurisdiction shall be randomly selected;
(2) One or more specific contests or races shall be randomly selected for each selected precinct; and
(3) All ballots in the selected contest(s) for each selected precinct shall be hand‑counted by bipartisan or multipartisan teams, and the manual count shall be compared to the machine tabulation.

(C) If discrepancies exceeding thresholds established by rule are identified, expanded hand‑counting or additional audits shall be conducted as prescribed by the [Chief Election Official].

Section 7. Rulemaking and Implementation.

(A) The [Chief Election Official] may promulgate rules necessary to implement this Act, including:

(1) Detailed reconciliation procedures;
(2) Formats for the Absentee Ballot Final Report; and
(3) Standards for random selection and expansion of hand‑count checks.

(B) This Act shall be codified in [Title __, Chapter__ of the State Election Code], and any conflicting provision of law is repealed to the extent of the conflict.
(C) This Act shall take effect on [date], and shall apply to elections held on or after that date.

Model Laws 2: Discretionary Certification and Election Official Protection Act

Section 1. Short Title.

This Act may be cited as the "Discretionary Certification and Election Official Protection Act."

Section 2. Certification Defined as a Discretionary Duty.

(A) Certification of election results by canvassing boards, county or municipal governing bodies, or the [Chief Election Official] is a discretionary duty, not a purely ministerial act.
(B) Election officials responsible for certification shall withhold certification if:

(1) Required reconciliation procedures have not been completed; or
(2) Material discrepancies or unresolved irregularities remain that call into question the accuracy of the results.

Section 3. Preconditions for Certification.

(A) Prior to certification, the certifying authority shall affirmatively determine and confirm that:

(1) All legally required reconciliation, verification, and chain‑of‑custody processes have been completed; and
(2) The results to be certified accurately reflect the ballots lawfully cast, subject only to any disclosed unresolved discrepancies.

(B) The certifying authority shall document its findings regarding completion of required procedures and the status of any discrepancies in a written certification report, which shall be an election record.

Section 4. Handling of Unresolved Discrepancies.

(A) If specific material discrepancies exist that cannot be resolved despite reasonable efforts, the certifying authority may proceed with certification only if it:

(1) Identifies in writing the specific unresolved discrepancies;
(2) Explains why they cannot be resolved; and
(3) Assesses and states whether, in its judgment, the discrepancies are likely to affect the outcome of any contest.

(B) The written explanation of unresolved discrepancies shall accompany the certification and shall be made available to the public.

Section 5. Authority to Delay Certification.

(A) The certifying authority may delay certification of any election for a reasonable period necessary to:

(1) Complete required reconciliation, verification, and audit procedures; or
(2) Investigate and resolve material discrepancies or irregularities.

(B) Standards for delay shall include:

(1) A requirement that the basis for delay be documented in writing;
(2) A requirement that the authority specify what steps are being taken to resolve outstanding issues; and
(3) A requirement that updated status reports be made available to the public at reasonable intervals.

(C) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit indefinite delay or to alter statutory deadlines without express legislative authority, but courts may extend deadlines when necessary to ensure accurate results.

Section 6. Protections for Election Officials.

(A) An election official or member of a canvassing board shall not be subject to civil or criminal liability solely for refusing or failing to certify election results that the official reasonably believes are inaccurate or incomplete due to unresolved reconciliation or verification issues, provided that the official:

(1) Acts in good faith;
(2) Documents the reasons for refusal or delay in writing; and
(3) Cooperates with lawful efforts to resolve outstanding issues.

(B) Nothing in this section shall shield an official from liability for willful misconduct, fraud, or intentional violation of law.

Section 7. Rulemaking and Implementation.

(A) The [Chief Election Official] may promulgate rules to implement this Act, including guidance on documentation, standards for determining material discrepancies, and model forms for certification reports.
(B) This Act shall be codified in [Title __, Chapter__ of the State Election Code], and any conflicting provision of law is repealed to the extent of the conflict.
(C) This Act shall take effect on [date], and shall apply to certifications of elections held on or after that date.

Model Laws 3: Independent Post‑Election Procedures and Results Audit Act

Section 1. Short Title.

This Act may be cited as the "Independent Post‑Election Procedures and Results Audit Act."

Section 2. Independent Post‑Election, Post‑Certification Audits.

(A) After certification of each general election, and for other elections as prescribed by law, an independent post‑election audit shall be conducted to evaluate both:

(1) Compliance with election procedures, including chain‑of‑custody, ballot handling, voter verification, and related processes; and

(2) The accuracy of reported results, including vote counts and tabulation accuracy.

(B) Audits shall be conducted by:

(1) The State Auditor;
(2) A Legislative Audit Bureau; or
(3) Another independent auditing entity designated by law, which is organizationally and operationally independent from the election offices and officials who administered the election.

Section 3. Independence and Access.

(A) Election offices or officials that administered the election shall not conduct or control the post‑certification audit of their own work, but shall cooperate fully with the independent auditors.
(B) Independent auditors shall have access to all election records necessary to perform the audit, including:

(1) Original documents;
(2) Chain‑of‑custody records for ballots and equipment;
(3) Reconciliation logs;
(4) System logs and configuration records; and
(5) Any other records required to assess procedural compliance and accuracy.

(C) Election officials and employees shall be required by law to cooperate with the auditors, and penalties may be imposed for willful failure or refusal to cooperate, as provided by statute.

Section 4. Auditor Qualifications and Scope.

(A) Auditors shall be trained in, or assisted by personnel with expertise in:

(1) The state election code;
(2) Applicable federal election laws and regulations; and
(3) The rules and procedures required by law for administration of elections

(B) The audit scope shall include, at a minimum:

(1) Review of compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements;
(2) Evaluation of chain‑of‑custody and record‑keeping practices;
(3) Testing or review of tabulation accuracy and reporting; and
(4) Assessment of any discrepancies or irregularities identified during or after the election.

Section 5. Documentation, Findings, and Corrective Action.

(A) Auditors shall document each step in the audit process and retain working papers as part of the permanent audit file.
(B) The audit report shall:

(1) Describe the procedures performed;
(2) Summarize findings regarding compliance and accuracy;
(3) Identify any deficiencies or violations; and
(4) Recommend corrective actions and timelines for implementation.

(C) Jurisdictions audited shall be required to respond in writing, indicating the steps they will take to implement recommended corrective actions and the timelines for doing so.
(D) Follow‑up reporting on implementation of corrective actions shall be made to the [State Auditor / Legislative Audit Bureau] and, as appropriate, to the legislature or public oversight bodies.

Section 6. Public Input and Transparency.

(A) Before commencement of each post‑election audit, the auditing entity shall provide public notice of the proposed scope and invite public comment and input for a reasonable period.
(B) A preliminary audit report, including detailed audit findings, shall be made public before the report is finalized, with an opportunity for public comment on issues not yet addressed by the auditors.
(C) Auditors shall consider public comments and, where appropriate, address them in the final report or in an accompanying response document.

Section 7. Rulemaking and Implementation.

(A) The [State Auditor / Legislative Audit Bureau], in consultation with the [Chief Election Official], may promulgate rules necessary to implement this Act, including standards for sampling, documentation, and public participation.
(B) This Act shall be codified in [Title __, Chapter__ of the State Code], and any conflicting provision of law is repealed to the extent of the conflict.
(C) This Act shall take effect on [date], and the first audit cycle under this Act shall apply to elections held on or after that date.

Principle 6 Appendix

Key resources

EAC – election security preparedness and audit resources.
https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/election-security-preparedness

EAC – fact sheet “Serving Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) Voters” (for military/overseas timing interactions).
https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2025-05/UOCAVA_Fact_Sheet_V2.1_Final_508.pdf

NIST – Election Security Project (includes audit‑related guidance).
https://www.nist.gov/itl/voting/research-and-projects/election-security

Applying the NIST Cybersecurity Framework to Elections (EAC/NIST slide deck).
https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/event_document/files/day2-2017-02-14-12_00-01-franklin-cybersecurity-framework1.pdf

NIST – security recommendations for election systems.
https://www.nist.gov/itl/voting/security-recommendations

State risk‑limiting audit statutes (e.g., Colorado) to be added by counsel as state‑specific examples.

2025–2026 federal legislation support

Make Elections Great Again Act (H.R. 7300) – authorizes HAVA funds for post-election audits.